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Information can provide insights into economic relations in less
developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for in-
stitutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or
inefficient. Sharecropping and other tenancy relationships in the






ECONOMICS OF INFORMATIONAND THE THEORYOF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*
by
J. E. Stiglitz
There is a widespread feeling that traditional neoclassical economic
theory has little, if any relevance to the problems of less developed
economies.Some of the important developments in the theoryduring the
past quarter of the century have provided considerable justification for
that view. Though the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics has shown
rigorously that there is a set of conditions under which Adam Smith's con-
jecture concerning the invisible hand has some validity, the conditions
required seem particularly inapplicable to the circumstances in which most
l.d.c.'s find themselves. In particular, there is not the full set ofmar-
kets——whether for risks, capital (futures), labor or products——that the
theoremrequires; information is far from perfect; the assumption of a
fixedand known technology seems particularly incongruent with an attempt
to understand the process by which l.d.c.'s adopt more advanced technologies
and by which new technologies diffuse through the economy; and the first
stages of development require the provision of infrastructure, which is a
public good, and/or is characterized by strong non—convexities.
The problems I have listed are, of course, well recognized, and they
are widely discussed under the rubric of "market failures." The liberal doctrines
*Invitedlecture, 1983 Meetings of Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria,
Belem, Brazil, December 6, 1983. Financial support of the National Science
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.—2—
of the 1960's and early 1970's had it that a certain amount of tinkering by
a benevolent government could remedy these deficiencies in the marketplace,
and with these limited interventions, the market economy would function well,
in the way that the classical theory had said it would all along.
To believers of neoclassical theory, the difference between l.d.c.'s and
developed countries was a matter of degree: the market failures were perhaps
more pronounced and thus stronger government intervention might be called
for. To critics, the qualifications were of central importance.
Two developments during the past decade, however, have necessitated a
reshaping of these views. The first is well known: many of the attempts by
governments, both in l.d.c.'s and developed countries, to remedy themarket
failures, which they saw have been less than successful. If markets do not
work, but government interventions to remedy their deficiencies also do not
work, where re we to go?
The second is perhaps. not so well known: at the same time that the
standard neoclassical theory was continually being refined, a number of
economists were attempting to construct models of the economy using neo-
classical tools of analysis, but introducing more realistic assumptions:
they were concerned with. investigating the causes and consequences of incom-
plete markets, imperfect information, and imperfectcompetition.1 In many
cases, these studies were motivated by an attempt to provide models with a
1. Among these earlier studies were George Akerlof's Theory of Lemons, which
became the forerunner of innumerable, analyses of markets characterized by
adverse selection, in which prices convey information (his work was moti-
vatedin part by observations concerning information problems he observed
during an extended stay in India).; Gary Fields' models of the education
market,and gjgjzs study of education as a screening device, both of
which were motivated by their experiences in Kenya (though 1'lichael Spence
independently derived a quite similar theory of education as a signal
J1974fl.—3—
greater relevance to l.d.c.'s; but the models which worked well often also
provided considerable insight into the kinds of macro—economic disequilibria
observed in developed countries as well.
These two developments are not unrelated: the Economics of Information
has focused on the information and incentive problems which are common both
to public and private organizations; it has provided at least part of the
rationale for Public Failures as well as Private Failures, and has provided
a frework within which a more rational basis for the assignment of
responsi'bilitiès to each sector can be made.
Inthe first part of this paper I wish to survey some of the more important
applications of the economics of information to the theory of economic de—
velopiuent, suggesting how the theory provides an explanation of phenomena
which,within the traditional neoclassical paradigm, appear irrational and/
or inefficient; I wish to go on to show that the policy implications of the
alternative paradigm may differ markedly from those of standard neoclassical
theoryq In the second part of this paper, I shall discuss in very general
termssome of the broader implications provided by the perspective of the
Economics of Information on the developmeht process and the role of the govern-
ment in that process.1
I..
1.Tenancy.Relationships in Agriculture: Sharecropping
The prevalence of sharecropping in agriculture in less developed countries
1, In this survey I shall not provide details of the models on which the
analysis is based; accordingly, I shall not be able to provide a corn—-
plete list ofqualifications which need to be made, either to any des—
•
criptive statement made or to any policy inference based on those des-
criptive statements. For these, the reader is referred to the original
papers on which this lecture is based.—4—
has always been somewhat of a puzzle to economists. Under sharecropping,
a worker receives less than the value of his marginal product, and this
seems to introduce an inefficiency. How could an inefficienct system of
land tenure be so persistent?
Onenatural answer was that it provided a means of risk
sharing. Workers were 'more risk averse than landlords, and the sharecropping
contract allowed the landlord to absorb 'more of the risk than he would if
workers rented the land from the landlord. Thus, the prevalence ofshare—
rct-vc.1 fr1 tr rr eF tht r1,.t- -f.4i,mc- 1rcrl
earlier,the absence of a complete set of risk markets, in which the worker
could insure himself against the many risks which he faced.
It was subsequently shown, however, that transferring risk provided
part, hut only part, of the explanation of sharecorpping: all the possi-
bilities of risk sharing which sharecropping provided could be provided
by combining wage and rental contracts, which seemingly lacked the inef—
fi.ciencies associated with sharecropping (,$tiglitz Il9J4a]). Iwent on to
show, however, that if there were no informational problems, there would, in
fact, be no inefficiencies associated with sharecropping; the contract would
specify precisely the amount of labor to be supplied by the worker. Cheung (1969),
having made a similar observation, argued that accordingly, if sharecropping
is widely observed, it must be because of some advantage in transactions
costs. While agreeing with the tenor of that argument, it has always seemed
to me that referring to transactions costs as an explanation is too easy and
incomplete an answer. If the explanation of some important phenomena resides
in the nature of the transactions costs, then transactions costs need to be
the focus of the analysis, and a more detailed 'modeling of the structure of—5--
transactions costs and of the implications of alternative institutional struc-
tures for transactions costs is required. In a sense, my focus on information
costs can be thought of as providing that detailed analysis) The information
problems that I focused on were associated with monitoring the actions of the
worker: it is prohibitively expensive, under most agricultural environments,
to monitor perfectly the actions of the worker, to ensure that he acts in the
interests of the landlord; for instance, that he weeds when and as much as he
should. It is far less costly to monitor the output of the farm than the
worker's input of effort. Moreover, because of the innumerable environmental
factorswhich affect each farm (weather, pestilence, disease), which again
cannot be perfectly monitored, by observing output one cannot make a perfect
inferenceconcerning the worker's input of effort.
If workers were risk neutral,2 then rental contracts would be employed.
Rental contracts allow the worker to receive the full value of the marginal
product of his efforts. But rental contracts force the worker to absorb all
the risk,
On the other hand with wage contracts the landlord absorbs all the risk,
which is a good thing, given that the landlord is so much less risk averse
than the worker. However, with a wage contract the worker has little incentive
1.In this. sense, the transactions costs approach, which has been so admirably
developed in somewhat different context by Oliver Williamson, and the
Economics of Information should be viewed as complementary. While the
former has identifed a number of broad considerations which are relevant
to the design of institutional arrangements, the latter has investigated
in detail the implications of one important source of transactions costs,
those arising out of the costs of acquiring and transferring information.
2.And there was no risk of tenants defaulting on their rental payments.
The consequences of the possibility of default have been investigated (in
a somewhat different context) by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).6—
to work; to ensure that he performs requires a high level of monitoring.
Though the costs of monitoring may not be too high for certain kinds of
crops, for others these costs may make such contracts undesirable.
The equilibrium sharecropping contract isthusseen as a compromise:
betweenthe incentive properties of rental contracts and the risk proper-
ties of wage contracts.
Changes in the environment and in technology——in the degree of risk,
in alternative means by which workers can divest themselves of risk or
diversify out of the risk (outside uncorrelated income opportunities), in
the degree of risk aversion (as the result of changes in wealth), and in the
costs of monitoring——Will alter the equilibrium contractual arrangement.
Thus,the new theory provides not only an explanation of sharecropping, but
also for the observed differences in land tenure systems, both over time
and in different locations. Sharecropping is not seen as an inefficient,
primitive method of land tenure, but as a rational solution to certain real
problems facing these economies.
Indeed,this analysis ofsharecropping has served as a prototype of
awhole class of information problems known as "principal—agent problems".
Theseare concerned with situations in whichone individual (theagent)
must take actions which affect another (the principal), where the agent
has more information than the principal (the worker knows the weather
better than the landlord), but the agent isrisk averse. Principal—agent
problemsarise in labor markets (theemployer—employee relationship) and
in insurance markets. They are pervasive inall economies; understanding
themprovides considerable insight into a number of institutional arrange-
ments, bothin developed and less developed economies, and alters in afundamental way the conclusions reached in standard neoclassical analysis.1
Let me mention four further applications of this analysis to l.d.c.'s
.2
A. Cost Sharing
Most agriculture requires inputs other than labor and land. The
question arises, how should those costs, e.g., of fertilizer, be shared
between the landlord and the worker? Though sharecropping contracts usually
entail some cost sharing, and though the share of costs borne by the worker
is frequently his share in output, this is by no means the universal form
of contractual arrangement. How do we explain these deviations from what
would appear to be the simplest, and most reasonable rule? It seems par-
ticularly difficult to explain these departures, in light of the fact that
the rule of equating cost share to output share would seem to lead to the
efficient utilization of inputs:, the worker would set his share of cost
1. In this lecture I am limiting myself to a discussion of how information
analysis affects the analysis of problems facing but I should
briefly mention how introducing these concerns alters the standard neo-
classical results. First, the usual convexity assumptions are not, in
general, satisfied: indifference curves and feasibility sets are not,
• in general, convex (rnott and Stiglitz [1983a]);coinpetitive equilibrium
may not exist, even when all the other strong assumptions of the standard
theory obtain (Arnott and Stiglitz 1l983bJ); when it does, it may have a
quite different character than depicted in standard competitive models,
as we have noted here, in the case of agricultural markets. (In other
markets, the price paid or received may depend on the quantity traded,
and there may be quantity rationing.) When competitive equilibrium exists,
it will not, in generals bePareto efficient (Arnott and Stiglitz {l983c]).
(Greenwald and Stiglitz [1984]); and it may not be possible to decentralize
efficient resouce allocations.
2.For a more extended discussion of cost sharing contracts, see Braverman
and Stiglitz (1983).—8—
equal to the value of the marginal product, times his share in output.
When the two are equal, the value of the marginal product would equal the
marginal cost (Cf. Heady [1947]). Once we recognize, however, thatthe
reason for sharecropping was the unobservability of effort, we canimmediately
obtain an explanation of these contractual arrangements: the landlord wishes
to encourage the worker to increase his effort; if the applicationof some
other input increases the worker's marginal product, and thus leads him to
increase his effort, then the landlord may wish to subsidize that input
(paying more than his proportionate share of the costs). Moreover, cost
sharing contracts are preferable to contracts in which the landlord speci-
fies the level of input, again because of the information asymmetry between
landlords and workers: the worker can adapt the level of inputs to changes
in circujntances in a way in which the landlord could not.
B. erl_1g
Inmany situations, thc landlord is not only the landlord;he is also
the provider of credit and, in some cases, the supplier of inputs, the
purchaser of outputs, etc. There is, in other words, extensive interlinking
between credit, labor, land, and product markets. Earlier allegations that
these were means by which the landlord attempted to exploit the worker were
never completely convincing: they never explained why, if the landlord
was really in a monopoly—monoposony position, he could not exploitall his
monopoly power through his land contract, extracting all the surplus fromthe
workers and forcing them down to the subsistence level.
1.This section is based on joint work with A. Braverman (Braverman—
Stiglitz 11983]).—9—
Our theory provides an explanation for this phenomenon, equally—-
applicable to competitive and noncompetitive environments. The landlord
would like the worker to work harder. In the previous paragraph we noted
that the worker's level of effort may well be affected by the supply of
other inputs (fertilizer). By the same token, the worker's level of effort
may be affected by what goes on in product and credit markets. The former
is easy to see: if alcohol decreases productivity, the landlord may wish
to restrict consumption of alcohol; if certain kinds of foods increase
productivity, the landlord may wish to encourage their consumption by
providing meals on the job or by subsidizing them in the company store.
If workers can be induced to borrow heavily, and then face the threat of
bondage, they may well work harder than they otherwise would.
So far in our discussion, we have focused on the landlord's interest
in encouraging the worker to supply greater effort. But there are other
decisions which the worker makes which affect the landlord. There are
innumerable risk decisions: by harvesting earlier, risk may be reduced,
but the average crop may be smaller. By postponing harvest, on average,
the crop may be larger, but there is some chance that a hailstorm will
destroy a significant fraction of the crop. It should be clear that the
interests of th landlord and the tenant are not likely to coincide: the
landlord, being less risk averse, may be more concerned with the effects
on average output. At the same time, in situations in which bonded labor
is not allowed, the landlord Tnr not be able to collect rents at the end
of the season, if the crop is bad, anc he lender may not-be able to force
the borrower to repay his loan. The probability of these events is again—l 0—
affected by the actions of the worker. The availability of credit and the
terms on which it is available thus may affect the probability that the
worker fails to pay his rent, and the risks he undertakes; and the terms
of the tenancy contract may affect the probability that a borrower fails to
repay his loan, and the risks he undertakes. There is a clear inter-
dependency in these two contracts, an important externality. Interlinkage
provides a way by which this externality is internalized.
In this new view, then, interlinkage is the natural response of the
market to a problem of externalities which arises whenever monitoring either
effort or risk—taking is costly. Attempts to restrict interlihkage,
either directly or indirectly (e.g., through providing credit at greatly
subsidized rates, which eliminates the landlord's favorable position for
providing credit) thus may reduce the efficiency with which rural markets
function, and may, in the long run, make both landlords and workers worse off.
C.Land Reform
One of the central results of the neoclassical paradigm is the clean
dichotomy it provides between equity (distribution) and efficiency con—
siderations Every competitive market equilibrium is Pareto efficient,
and every Pareto efficient allocation can be attained through some redis-
tribution of initial endowments.
In the newly developing theory that I have been describing in this
lecture, there is not so clean a distinction. First, not only is it
recognized that lump sum redistributions do not occur, but it provides an
explanation for why redistributive taxes are always distortionary: the—11—
government can only base redistributions on certain observable character-
istics of the individual, such as his income, and these characteristics
are always alterable. The government does not have the information re-
quired to implement an equitable, non—distortionary redistributive scheme.
Second, the nature of the contractual arrangements which occur in an
economy depends critically on the distribution of wealth, and these con-
tractual arrangements have an important effect on the productivity of the
economy. Sharecropping (with its associated second—best distortions)
__J___.__1_. ____1__._.. i_ t______ _1__ ___11_ __1_-, II dLbb WULL UO LLUL LAVtLLI WL±LU tO purcLlase Luelr Own ianu
andto bear the associated risks.2 A land reformthus has the potential
ofsubstantially increasing the productivity of the economy; because
workers obtain the full marginal productivity of their efforts, they may
be willing to put in more effort (and to make "efficient" choices of
3 technique).
Two caveats tcY the argument that land reform may increase produc-
tivity, both based on information theoretic considerations, should, how-
ever, be noted, First, agricultural productivity depends not only on
1.This view of taxation has beenput forwardinAtkinson—stiglitz (1980) and Stiglitz (l982c).
2.More precisely, if all individuals had theseme wealth and degree of risk aversion, then there would beno need to transfer risks, and hence,
a principal—agent (moral hazard) problem wouldnot arise. If individ- uals differed in their riskaversion, evenwith an equalitaian wealth
distribution,there would be some risktransferring, and hence some moralhazard problem, but it wouldbe much lesssignificant than under thepresent wealth distribution.
3.As we noted earlier, whenever there isa principal—agent problem, the
agent may make choices of techniques whichare not in the interests of
the principal. Bue even when there isnot a principal—agent problem,
if there is an incomplete set ofmarkets, and the relative price of the
agricultural good is sensitive to the level ofoutput, then, in general,
the equilibrium is not (constrained) Paretoefficient.—12—
the input of labor (effort), but on other inputs as well. Poor farmers may
not have the working capital to obtain the requisite inputs of fertilizer
or high—quality seeds, or the resources to make productivity—enhancing
improvements to their land. More generally, access to capital markets for
small borrowers is likely to be more restricted than for large land-
lords, and when small farmers do have access, the terms at which they
obtaincapitalmay be less favorable; this will adversely affect agricul-
tural productivity. This differential access to capital markets should
not be viewed simply as a market imperfection; rather, it may reflect the
lenders' experiences with repayments of loans from small versus large
borrowers, and the differential costs of assessing who among the small
borrowers are good risks)
Second, productivity in agriculture may begreatly affected by tech-
nical progress; improved seeds, improved fertilizers, and improved farming
practices. Large landowners may be in a better position to acquire, and
then disseminate, this information, than are small farmers; in any case,
giventhat the costs of acquiring this information may be viewed as a
fixed cost, independent of the scale of operation of the farmer, the
incentivesfor large landowners to stay abreast are greater.
D. Technical Progress
There has been a long debate over whether landlords resist innova—
tions which might improve the plight of peasants. Neoclassical theory
1. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) have formulated models of competitive
capital markets in which there is credit rationing, and in which some
classes of potential borrowers are excluded from the market and differ-
ent classes of borrowers are charged different interest rates.—13—
provides an easy answer to this: any innovation which moves the production
possibilities schedule outward will move the utilities possibilities
schedule' outward; in acompetitive economy, no landlord will be in a
position to resist the innovation (even if, in the new equilibrium, land—
lords as a wholewill be better off), while any monopolist landlord who
was in a position to push his peasants down to the subsistence level would
wish to adopt the innovation (Figure 1).
The New Theory has shown that this argument is not necessarily correct.
There are innovations which shift the production possibilities curve out-
ward, but shift the utility possibilities schedule inward; these innova-
tions will nob be adopted, even though net national income might be in-
creased. The reason for this is simple: some innovations, while increas-
ing the level of output at each level of input, may exacerbate the moral
hazard—incentive problems of whichwe spoke earlier.An innovation which
increasedthe average productivity of workers but decreased the marginal
productivity of workers might, in a sharecropping economy, result in the
peasant decreasing his work effort, enough so that output is actually
reducedand the landlord is worse off. The landlord may, in such in-
stances, attempt to restrict the adoption of these innovations.
2.Wage Determination and Urban Unemployment
The second general application of the New Theory which I wish to dis-
cuss today is to the problem of urban wage determination and urban
1.The utility possibilities schedule gives the maximum utility that one
(group of) individuals(s) can obtain given the utility level of all other
individuals.
2.For a more extensive discussion of the theory of technological innova-










A technical change which, in the absence of moral hazard, moves
the utilities possibilities schedule unambiguously outward, and
will always be adopted, with moral hazard may move the utilities
possibilities schedule inward.
After technical change, no moral hazard
problem
Utility (workers)—14—
unemployment. It has long been noted that wages in the urban sectorseem per-
sistently higher than those in the rural sector, and that these high wages
are associated with extensive urban unemployment. (High levels
of unemployment have also been a persistent feature of more developed
countriesas well.) Wages at above market—clearing levels seem inconsist-
ent with traditional neoclassical economic theory. Earlier development
economists ascribed these high wages to institutional rigidities, unions,
etc These theories——if they can be called that——have always seemed a
bit unstisfactory. First, they never gave much insight into what poli-
ciesmight change the urban wage, or indeed, what policies were feasible.
Ifunions "set" the real wage, would it respond to an increase in food
pricesby raising money wages, to keep workers' utility constant? Many
analyses of how the government should reduce urban unemployment have been
predicated on a rigid wage model which presumes a level of naivete on the
part of unions, if it is they who are setting the wage, which is hard to
believe. Second, unemployment has characterized—-and continues to charac-
terize——economies in which unions are not strong.
The New Theories provide an explanation for high wages, i.e., wages
above market—clearing levels. All that is required is that productivity
ofworkers increases with wages and that workers are not paid on a
strictly piece—rate basis.
Whenever productivity increases with wages, it is possible that market
equilibrium will be characterized by unemployment.The usual argument
for why market equilibrium is characterized by full employment is that,
if there is an excess supply of workers, the unemployed worker approaches—15—
the firm,offeringhis services at a lower wage than that paid to the
current employees. The wage is thus driven down, the demand for labor
increased, and the supply decreased; the process continues until full
employment is attained. But if productivity depends on wages, the
employer will not necessarily hire a worker who offers to -work at a
lower wage; the employer may believe that his productivity will be lower,
sufficiently lower than his labor costs will actually be increased.
Thus, there may be an equilibrium with unemployment, with no forces
leading to a reduction in wages. The wage which minimizes labor costs
(minimizesthe wage per efficiency unit) iscalled the efficiency wage
andis depicted in Figure 2.
There are several reasons that productivity may increase withwages.
Earlier work (Leibenstein) focused on a nutritional relationship, though
more recent work (B1iss—Stern has raised questions concerning this.
But the Economics of Information has provided two other sets of ex—
planat ions.
First, workers differ in their bilities, but firms may not be
able to ascertain perfectly who is better and who is worse. But firms
know that if they pay a higher wage they will get a higher quality
applicant pool% Thus, firms will not cut wages, in the face of excess-
supply of labor, because of the fear that it will -reduce the quality of
their applicant pool.(See Stiglitz 1l976a],Weiss 1l9.80J).
Second, firms seldom can monitor costlessly, or perfectly, the
actions of the workers. To induce workers to work hard, there must he










which all workers are identical (so no worker is more of a shirker than
another) and all firms are identical. In neoclassical theory, equilibrium
would be characterized by all workers receiving the same wage and there
being no unemployment. If a worker shirked, the worst punishment that h
could be given would be to be fired; but since there is no unemployment,
he would be immediately rehired: the worker would have no incentIve not
to shirk. To •induce workers to work, a firm might attempt to Taise its
wage over rivals; but since all firms are identical, they all try to
raise their wages. At the higher wages, their demand for labor is reduced.
There is an equilibrium level of unemployment. The unemployment acts as a
discipline device for workers: now there is a real cost to shirking (even
if when they eventually get rehired they get paid the same wage that the7
did in the previous job). (See Shapiro—Stiglitz [1984), Calvo [1979].)
This example illustrates a more general principle: when, because of
the relationship between wages and productivity, wages are rigid (in the
senseexpla:tned above), unemployment may serve as an equilibrating device.
These are not the only explanations of the relationship between wage
and productivity. Lowering the wage may Increase labor turnover, and if
there are. specific training—hiring costs which are borne by the firm, this
will increase the firm's total labor costs.' (See Stiglitz, 1974a, 1974b.)
1.For a more extended discussion of these alternativetheories, see
Stig1tz(1982a, 1984a), Akerloff (1984),.and Yellon (1984).—17—
Thus, we have shown that one of the fundamental tenets of neoclassical
economics, the law of supply and demand, which holds that competitive equi—
librium requires the equality of demand andsupply,is not, in general,
valid. Equilibrium may be——and frequently appears to be——characterized
by an excess supply of laborers.
Thesearguments apply with equal force to other 'markets as well. Equi-
librium in capital markets may be characterized by credit rationing, by an
excess demand for capital. Increasing the rate of interest ray have
aderseselection effects——the applicant pool may have a higher probability
of default——and adverse incentive effects——those who do borrow may have an
incentive to undertake greater risks.1
Not only does the New Theory provide an explanation for an important
set of phenomena which neoclassical theory cannot explain, but it also
has strong policy implications. We consider here only three.
A.Wage Subsidies
In the older view, the presence of unemployment meant that the oppor-
tunity cost of labor was zero, and firms 'should be induced to hire 'more
workers. Thus, a common prescription recommended on the 1960s was for
the government to provide a wage subsidy. Most of these analyses assumed,
however, that the urban wage would remain unchanged; our analysis suggests
that some fraction of the wage subsidy may be shifted towards workers.
(The extent of shifting will depend on the source of the relationship
1.Thus, the standard paradigm requires that the employer (the lender,
thelandlord) be able to observe perfectly (and costlessly) the actions of
theemployee (borrower, tenant) so that the compensation of the agent
depends precisely on his actions (and only on his actions).—18--
betweenwages and productivity, and the form of the wage subsidy; whether
the wage subsidy is an ad valorem wage subsidy or a specific wage subsidy
will, in this theory, have an important effect on the extent of shifting.
If there is shifting, then the higher urban wage may result in more migra-
tion from the rural sector, the equilibrium level of unemployment may in-
crease, and the level of national income might actually decrease.
B.Unemploent Compensation
In some versions of the New Theory, unemployment compensation may
actuallyincrease theunemployment rate and lead to a lower level of
nationalincome. This istrue, for instance, of the model where unemploy-
ment is serving as a discipline device for workers. The penalty that a
worker faèed upon being fired depends on the magnitude of unemployment
compensation; the larger the uneinploynient compensation, the lower the
cost of being fired, and hence, the higher the wage must be to induce
workers not to shirk.
C. Shadow Wages
The observation of extensive urban unemployment led many economists
to conclude that the shadow wage of workers was zero.
Subsequent work in the 1960s and early 1970s emphasized that increas-
ing employment might increase consumption, and thus decrease the surplus
which is available for investinent Thus, if investment is more highly
valued at the margin thaü consumption, the shadow wage will be positive
(though so long as consumption has some marginal value, less than the
urban wage). In the new view, increasing urban employment has at least—19—
two important effects that need to be taken into account. First, it affects
the equilibrium level of wages in the urban sector. Second, the change in
thewage, as well as the change in the employment level, results in migra-
tionfrom the rural sector. Inthe polar case where both the urban and
rural wage remain unchanged, and migration continues to the point where
the expected urban wage (that is, the wage times the probability of getting
the job) equals the rural wage, the unemployment rate will remain unchanged,
the loss in output in the rural sector is just equal to the urban wage,
andthere is nochange inaggregateconsumption. Thus, independent of the
socialweight attached to investment, the shadow price on labor is just the
urban wage. Although this is clearly a polar case, it is clearly more
-
reasonablethan the other polar cases investigated in the literature,
e.g., which assume that there will be no migration from the rural to the
urbansector.
II.
In the previous sections I have attempted to sketch how the New
Economics of Information has changed our views of how markets work, of
the nature of equilibrium as well as the efficiency of competitive markets.
In this section, I want to explore some of the insights which the New
Theoryprovides on the broader issues of the nature of the development
process nd the role of the government. By their nature,myremarks in
thissection are intended tobemorespeculative than those of the pre-
cedingsection.
1.For a more extensive development of these ideas, see Stiglitz (1982b),
and Sah and Stiglitz (1984).—20—
What distinguishes less developed countries from more develope&-
countries? This is a question which has been at the center of debates
over the development process for decades. If one could identify the
critical determinants, one presumably might have greater hope for inter-
vening, in a positive way, to assist this process.
For a while, there was a view that a principal difference between
developedand less developed economies was the level of capital accumula-
tion; this diagnosis led to an immediate prescription: transfer (either
by gifts or loan)capital and the difference between the developed and
theless developedcountries will be significantly lessened. Though a
lackof capital is obviously associated with a lack of development, this
in itself is not a sufficient explanation——if it were, presumably the
return to capital would be high, and the usual market forces would be at
work leading to a transfer of capital from developed to lessdeveloped
countries.
Othershave attributed the lack of development to a lack of human
resources, with the obvious prescription that what is required is invest-
ment in human capital. Though again, this may be important, it is only
part of the explanation: the high levels of unemployment among the
educated in some l.d.c.'s, and the large numbers of the highly educated
working at jobs utilizing few of their skills suggests that something
more is at stake.
A third "missing factort' that is often noted is rather more vague
than the preceding two; it is referred to as entrepreneurship, the ability
to organize resources, to produce goods and services that are wanted by—21—
other individuals, and to market and deliver those goods and services.
Again, though this may be part of the explanation, there are cultures
which are noted for their entrepreneurial talents; ethnic groups which,
when they migrate to other countries, seem to flourish, but within their
native environment seem unable to bring about the transformation of their
own country.
Though the absence or presence of entrepreneurship by itself is not
sufficient to account for the state of the economy, entrepreneurship
combined with certain other critical ingredients may be. An analysis of
these may provide some insight into the appropriate role of the government.
First, and most important, there must be an appropriate linkage
between entrepreneurship and capital: it is not only the aggregate level
of investment that is important, but also the allocation of capital re-
sources. And it is not just the allocation of resources among sectors,
which has been the focus of traditional planning analyses, it is also the
allocation of (capital) resources among managers. We all know that there
are some enterprises in an industry which turn out to be very profitable,
other enterprises within the same industy which are much less so. Intra—
industry variability in profits may be as large as inter—industry varia—
bility Though there are a large number of factors which account for
these differences, part of the difference lies in what we can refer to
loosely as the quality of management. The allocation of resources among
alternative management teams is one of the central problems facing capi-
talist economies. It is an information problem, and a problem to which
society devotes an enormous amount of resources. (Indeed, it corresponds—22—
tothe selection problem discussed earlier.) It is, however, a problem
which has been ignored within the planning literature.
We also noted in our earlier discussion the importance of the incen-
tive problem in market economies. The problem of incentives does not, of
course, disappear when an enterprise is taken over by the government. The
issue of the appropriate design of incentives is as important for state
enterprises as itisfor private enterprises.
Thegovernment, it used to be argued, had an advantage over private
enterprises in reeolving another information problem n coordinating deci-
sion making. But this view ignores the enormous amount of information ex-
change and coordination which occurs in decentralized market economies.
Before U.S.Steel constructed its steel mills on the southern shore of Lake
Michigan,it had to ensure that it had an assured source of supply for the
necessary inputs (coal, limestone, iron ore) and it attempted to ascertain
whether there would be a ready market for its output. An enormous amount
of coordination, of information exchange, was required, but it occurred in
a decentralized manner. Thus, the question is not whether there should be
coordination, but how that coordination is to occur, where the locus of
informationexchange should be.If information transmission and process-
ing were costless and if there were no incentive problems——so everyone
transmitted all of his information accurately——clearly there would be
everything to be gained and nothing to be lost, from the centralization
of information. But these assumptions are no more realistic than the
assumptionthat goods are costlessly produced, and drop, freely from the
sky, like manna from Heaven.—23—
(Note that the traditional competitive paradigm, as exemplified by the
work of Arrow and Debreu, is no more realistic in this respect than:the
traditional planning literature: they assume that all information exchange
occurs via prices, ignoring the importance of othersignals and methods of
information acquisition and dissemination.)
If the major source of market failure was one of the simple forms dis-
cussed in the early l960s, e.g., externalities, the role of the government
would be clear. It would need to intervene, to ensure either through price
or regulatory interventions, that these externalities become effectively
internalized.The government simply needs to change the incentives facing
private firms, to ensure that they act in accord with what is socially
desirable.But if a major source of market failure is associated with
the information problems with which we have been concerned in this lecture,
there is no obvious prescription. The information problems, of selection,
of incentives, of corrdination and information exchange, are no different
for the government than for the private sector, and indeed, in some dimensions,
they may clearly be worse. One may argue that there are market forces
which work to ensure that those who are entrusted to the management of
capital and human resources are those who have a comparative advantage in
doing so. There is no reason to believe that the electoral process (when
it works) works to select public officials who have a comparative advantage
in selecting good managers, or who have a comparative advantage in designing
incentive structures which ensure that individuals work hard, and that
their work is directed at pursuits which are or might be construed to be
in the National Interest. (Indeed, the fact that so many governments have—24—
devisedregulatory systems and tax structures of such complexity
and with so many distortions that much of the talented resources are
devoted to dealing with these regulations, attempting to avoid their most
deleterious consequences and to tax arbitrage, to taking advantage of the
inconsistencies and differential tax rates which arise inevitably within
thesecomplex tax structures, suggeststhat governments may be particularly
ineptat solving these problems, for reasons which may be explained by
the nature of the political process).
Similarly, governments, notingthe prevalence of credit rationing,
haveoften intervened to improve the functioning of capital markets. They
have simply assumed that the imperfection of the credit market was just
another manifestation of the imperfectionof market economies. A govern-
mentcould easilyintervene, to design a better functioning capital mar-
ket,allocating capitalon a more rational basis.The experience ininany
countriesin which governments have attempted this is not entirely favor—
able:default rates have been high, real interestrateshave been kept
atlow levels, access to credit has been based more onpolitical con-
siderations thanon economic considerations, and overall, there has been
littleevidence that a greater degree of "rationality" in resource allocation
hasbeen achieved. Our analysis again provides some insight into this
public failure: we have argued that credit rationing will occur in com-
petitive markets characterized by imperfect information, where the lender
isimperfectly informed concerning the characteristics of potential bor-
rowers and cannot perfectly monitor their actions.These selection and
incentive problems are no less important when the government takes over—25—
responsibility for allocating credit. Indeed, the problem becomes
exacerbated, because political consideration may become paramount in
the allocation of credit, in a way which they do not in a market economy.
In thislecture, Ihave attempted to argue that the information prob-
lems whichare central to private market economies are equally important
in public enterprises; that they give rise to public (government) fail-
ures, just as they give rise to private (market) failures. I have not,
however, had time to show more precisely how Information Analysis can
providesome insights into the specific nature ofpublic failures, into
thewidely observed phenomena of excessive red tape and rapid growth in
the size of the administrative labor force in the public sector. A de-
tailed analysisof the incentive structures within the public sector can,
I believe, provide us with considerable insight into these phenomena.1
IV. Concluding Remarks
Inconclusion, let me reiterate the general theme of this lecture:
traditional economic theory has ignored the central problems associated
with costly information. When due attention is paid to these information
theoretic considerations, the basic propositions of neoclassical analysis
nolonger remain valid: market equilibrium may not exist, even when all
1.The analysis which I have presented often seems so rnuch like simple
common sense that it hardly deserves to be called an economic theory.
(This is in contrast to lessons of neoclassical economics, which seem-
ingly can only be learned through the discipline of a rigorous graduate
school training.) Let me say two things in my defense. First, there
is nothing as uncommon as good common sense; and the fact that the
theory that we have developed here is in accord with everyday obser-
vations is to be viewed as a virtue, not a vice. Second, rigorous
formulations of the ideas presented here have been developed elsewhere.
Understanding these more rigorous formulations does require an under-
standing of the kinds of tools acquired in a disciplined graduate school
training, Thus, while the lessons learned in graduate school may no
longer be valid, the techniques of analysis have not yet become obsolete.
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the underlying preferences and production sets are "well behaved"; when
equilibrium exists, it is, in general, not Pareto efficient; it may not
be possible to decentralize efficient resource allocations; the separation
between efficiency and equity considerations which characterizes tradi-
tional neoclassical theory no longer obtains; market equilibrium may be
characterized by an excess demand for credit or an excess supply of labor
(that is, the law of supply and demand no longer holds). The theory
whichhas been developed explicitly incorporating information theoretic
considerations provides an explanation of phenomena about which traditional
theory simply had nothing to say.
In this lecture, I have been particularly concerned with showing how
this New Theory can provide insights into markets in less developed
economies, to show how it can provide explanation for institutions which
in neoclassical theory appear anomalous and/or inefficient. In some cases,
ityieldsclear implications for policy, implications which are at variance
withthose emerging from traditional neoclassical analysis. In other
cases, all we have obtained so far is a word of caution: information
problemsmay give rise to public (governmental) failures just as they
give rise to market failures. The analysis of the appropriate role of the
government is far more complex than traditional analyses lead us tobelieve.
Butifwe have learned this simple lesson, we may havelearned a lot.REFERENCES
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